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INFORMATION PACKAGING IN FUNCTIONAL DISCOURSE
GRAMMAR
Niels SMIT1
• ABSTRACT: The paper addresses the modelling of information packaging in Functional
Discourse Grammar (FDG), in particular the treatment of Topic, Comment and Focus.
Current FDG has inherited the traditional Functional Grammar (FG) representation of these
categories as functions, which attach to Subacts of evocation. However, arguments of a
formal, notional and descriptive nature can be advanced against pragmatic function
assignment and in favour of an alternative analysis in which informational and evocational
structures are dissociated so as to command their own primitives. In the context of a
model of discourse knowledge organisation in which communicated contents are
associated with packaging instructions that tell the Addressee how to treat the evoked
knowledge, it is argued that focality can be modelled by means of a Focus operator that
can attach to various constituents at the Interpersonal Level. Topicality, on the other hand,
concerns binomial and monomial modes of presenting communicated contents. This can
be rendered by means of the dedicated informational units Topic (Top) and Comment
(Cm), that interact in frames.
• KEYWORDS: Information packaging; topic; comment; focus; Functional Discourse
Grammar
1 Introduction
Besides the construal of semantic representations, informational structuring
of the knowledge contained in these representations is a central task of the
Formulator in Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG). Considerations regarding
mental activation state, contrastiveness and information packaging play an
important role in accounting for differential expression strategies that convey a
single semantic structure.
The term information packaging was coined by Chafe (1976). According to
Vallduví (1994, p.2), it
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indicates how information conveyed by linguistic means fits into a
(hearer’s mental model of the) context or discourse. When
communicating a proposition, a speaker may realise it by means of
different sentential structures according to his/her beliefs about the
hearer’s knowledge and attentional state with respect to that
proposition.
As such, information packaging is a subdivision of information structure
(HALLIDAY, 1967) and comprises notions like Topic, Focus, Comment,
Background, Theme, Frame, Rheme, etc. It excludes other informational
categories, in particular those pertaining to the activation status of mental
extensions (GUNDEL et al., 1993), interpropositional coherence devices (KEHLER,
2002), and inferences related to contrastiveness (UMBACH, 2004).
This paper presents objections against the treatment of information
packaging in terms of pragmatic function assignment as is currently advocated
in FDG, and proposes an alternative model that dissociates the evocation of
mental extensions from information packaging. In addition, it offers separate
analyses of its two constituent dimensions, topicality and focality. The proposal
furthermore fits the FDG objective to formulate combinatorial primitives (frames)
at each level of Grammar that can be stored in the Fund.2
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the current approach
to Topic and Focus in FDG. Section 3 outlines a model of discourse knowledge
management, and introduces the crucial distinction between extragrammatical
informational relations and the grammatically relevant exponents of these
relations. Section 4 gives a critical assessment of pragmatic function assignment
in FDG, and argues that the approach has to be abandoned for the analysis of
packaging categories. An alternative frame-based proposal is presented in
section 5. Section 6 illustrates the working of the proposal on the basis of some
examples, before a conclusion is reached in section 7.
2 Information packaging in FDG
The proposals regarding the analysis of information structure found in Dik’s
first version of Functional Grammar (DIK, 1978, p.129 ff) have exerted a profound
influence on all subsequent accounts. Even though some of his specific ideas
have been called into question by later authors (e.g. MACKENZIE; KEIZER, 1991
2 Frames (GARCÍA-VELASO; HENGEVELD, 2002) are lexically stored primitives, consisting of empty slots
(and, in the case of predicational frames, functions), into which designating units can be inserted. It is stipulated
that the saturated frame has a single, compositional designation, which is ‘richer than the sum of its parts’
due to the interactions between those parts.
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on the status of Topic in English), and notwithstanding more general concerns
formulated in De Vries (1993) and Bolkestein (1998), two basic aspects of Dik’s
original view have been retained through thirty years of theory formation, and
have recently been embraced by FDG as well (cf. HENGEVELD; MACKENZIE
2006; 2008, Forthcoming). The first is a strong inclination towards what Vallduví
(1992, p.44) calls a “binomial informational division of the sentence”. In Dik’s
view, Topic and Focus are considered mutually exclusive notions belonging to a
single dimension of information packaging. Second, all subsequent accounts
follow Dik’s original decision that these categories are best represented formally
as functions assigned to units in the underlying clause structure.
Within the predication as the core unit of analysis, Dik (1978, p.130)
distinguishes Topic, which signals that the constituent to which it applies
“presents the entity ‘about’ which the predication predicates something”, and
Focus, which signals “the relatively most important or salient information”. Both
are represented as functions, assigned to semantic units in the underlying clause
structure. With respect to this particular notational decision, Dik (1978, p.29)
observes that “they are functions inasmuch that they can be predicated of
constituents only with respect to some wider setting in which they occur”. In
other words, Topic and Focus are relational notions assigned on the basis of
context, and  not inherent statuses of denotations.
In FDG, underlying clause structure is split into two orthogonal systems.
The representational level (henceforth RL) is concerned with objective, context-
independent denotation while the interpersonal level (henceforth IL) designates
the evocation of denotations in the context of a communicative situation. Given
this division of labour, Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2006) propose to move
information packaging to IL, where Topic and Focus are retained as pragmatic
functions. Consequently, Topic and Focus now attach to the Subacts that evoke
what the communicated content is about and the most salient information it
contains, respectively. Assuming ‘happy discourse’ (REINHART, 1982) in which
interlocutors act according to the Cooperative Principle and observe all four
conversational maxims (GRICE, 1975), consider the mini-discourse given in (1):3
(1) A: (What about the dóg?) Who did it bíte?
B: It bit the póstman
Responding cooperatively to A’s question, B provides the identity of the
Undergoer in an otherwise presupposed event of which ‘the dog’ is the referent
that the statement ‘is about’. In (1’), the pragmatic function assignment to the
3 In all English examples, acute accent (´) is used to indicate rising pitch, grave accent (‘) for falling pitch.
Emphatic stress is indicated with SMALLCAPS.
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interpersonal structure of B’s answer reflects the respective statuses of the
evocational Subacts concerned:4
(1’) IL: A1: [— (C1: [
f1(+id T1) 
x1(+id R1)Top 
x2(+id R2)Foc])Ø —]
RL: pst e1: [—[(f1: [—bite—]) (x1)A (x2: [—postman—])U]—]
The packaging of entities evoked in a given Discourse Act should not be
confused with the activation state of their extensions. While there is a strong
correlation between Topical status and givenness, and between Focal status
and newness, this is far from absolute. For instance, a felicitous Discourse Act
may evoke only known entities, but in a combination that is informative for the
Addressee. The distinction between packaging status and activation state is
formally explicit in FDG, where the latter is captured by means of operators like
[±identifiable] that attach to evocational Subacts.
The interplay between packaging status, other informational considerations
and semantic function (cf. JASINSKAJA et al, 2004) determines the expression
of ‘the dog’ in (1B) as a weak pronoun, and ‘the postman’ as a lexical NP with
pitch accent, both in their respective dedicated linear positions with respect to
the inflected verb.
3 Information packaging and discourse knowledge management
Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2006, p.669) remark that FDG “is the grammatical
component of a wider theory of verbal interaction”. Since it is one of the central
aims of verbal interaction to manipulate the discourse knowledge5 of one’s
interlocutor, this means that the question of how to treat information packaging
in Grammar is inextricably linked to the interaction between Grammar and the
Contextual Component where such knowledge is located.
Since the interlocutor’s discourse knowledge PA is not directly accessible,
language users rely on recursive models, reflecting their own assumptions about
4 In most analyses, RL is included to disambiguate the designations of evocational Subacts. Superscript variables
indicate correspondences between IL and RL: they do not have theoretical status, but are merely intended to
enhance readability. Em dashes indicate omission of further complexity within layers. Alphanumeric indexation
is only used in maximally abstract representations, while numeric indexation is used in concrete cases. Note
furthermore that the representations in this paper follow Smit and Van Staden (this volume), who argue that
restrictors take the shape of predications. The resulting differences are largely immaterial to the present
proposal, however.
5 Discourse knowledge is subsumed under Dik’s (1997, p.10) pragmatic information. It refers to the entire set
of semantic presuppositions immediately available to the language user at any point in the interaction. The
use of immediately in the previous sentence does not mean to indicate that there is a hard divide between ‘discourse
knowledge’ and ‘other knowledge’, but rather a continuum, to be thought of in terms of spreading activation.
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the other’s knowledge (PA)S, their assumptions about the other’s assumptions
about their knowledge ((PS)A)S, etc. When performing a DECLarative
6 discourse
Act, language users calibrate the information packaging of the message to their
model of the interlocutor’s knowledge. This model is organised in two orthogonal
dimensions, addressation and updating.
Addressation (JACOBS, 2001, p.650) concerns the thematic organisation of
presuppositions in discourse knowledge as entries under addresses (rn) in a
metaphorical ‘file cabinet’ (HEIM, 1983). An address collates entries relevant to
a single discourse referent (KARTTUNEN, 1969), which together constitute an
incremental domain of evaluation for incoming propositions. This facilitates swift
retrieval of presupposed knowledge and efficient evaluation of asserted
knowledge. In this process of assessment (REINHART, 1982), updating becomes
relevant, because the Addressee must be instructed how the propositional
content of the message contributes to his discourse knowledge. An asserted
proposition can update an address in two ways: it may add an entire entry to
the address, or instantiate empty slots in a pre-existing entry.7
Figure 1 illustrates how for an example like (1B), the interaction between
communicative intention, Grammar and discourse knowledge determines the
shape of the expression. In the case of the question-answer pair in (1), it can be
inferred from the shape of B’s answer that his own knowledge does not give
cause to dispute the assertions implied in A’s question, namely the presupposition
that ‘the dog bit __’, and the construal of ‘the dog’ as the address where this
presupposition is assessed and stored. B’s communicative intention to update
A’s presupposition by instantiating the patient slot and his conformation to A’s
choice of address codetermine the shape of the answer. Also, having provided
A with the desired information, B adapts his own model of A’s knowledge, and
will henceforth assume A to presuppose the full event ‘the dog bit the postman’.
6 The scope of the present proposal is limited to information packaging in Acts with DECLarative illocution.
Discourse Acts with other illocutions, notably INTERrogatives, are assumed to behave differently in terms of
information packaging.
7 (Partial) substitution of one entry for another is excluded, since presuppositions can be cancelled, but not
erased. Substitution hence is tantamount to the augmentation of knowledge because the cancelled
presupposition remains accessible.
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Figure 1 – The interaction of S’s communicative intention, Grammar
and assumptions about A’s discourse knowledge
Such considerations are reflected in Grammar as packaging instructions in
the sense of Vallduví (1992, p.4), which tell the addressee how the contents of the
message are to affect his discourse knowledge. In line with the two dimensions of
information packaging introduced above, the speaker provides three such
instructions: a GOTO instruction that specifies under which address the addressee
is expected to file the proposition, an ASSESS instruction that tells him to assess
the contents of the proposition, and an UPDATE instruction that identifies what
part of the incoming proposition differs from what the speaker assumes is already
presupposed, and hence constitutes information. Execution of the instructions
results in the establishment of informational relations between pieces of knowledge
in the contextual component. Between addresses and entries, a durable relation
of relevance or aboutness is established, while a momentaneous relation of non-
retrievability holds between pieces of knowledge in innovative combinations.8
4 Problems with pragmatic function assignment
While it may seem from the analysis in (1’) that pragmatic function
assignment is a suitable way to model information packaging, I believe that this
yields several problems. In what follows, these will be discussed in detail.
8 The relation of non-retrievability holds between two pieces of knowledge, the combination of which cannot
be predicted on the basis of the presuppositional structure of the Addressee at the time of utterance. It is
momentaneous, in that the non-retrievability dissolves at the moment of utterance (cf. LAMBRECHT, 1994).
Also, while one of the pieces involved is typically new or newly activated, this is not necessarily the case;
consider cases like has the lady kissed the postman? – No, hé kissed HÉR, where the reply is highly informative
even though no new referents are introduced.
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4.1 Formal objections
Anstey (2006, p.72) criticises FDG for being a pseudo-formal framework in
that its notation is “inconsistently interpreted as formal in some cases and non-
formal elsewhere”. At least in part, this problem derives from the fact that the
ontology (the available classes of primitives) and syntax (the combinatorics
governing the members of these classes) of the formal algorithm are
underspecified in several respects. In Hengeveld and Smit (Forthcoming) and
Smit and Van Staden (this volume), attempts are made to remedy this lack of
explicitness. Here, I want to single out the role of functions.
It will be assumed that functions (ϕ) in FDG operate in predicational
configurations of the form [(αi) (αj)ϕ] where they specify the quality of the
interaction between a relator and its relatum. This follows what has been
standing practice throughout Functional Grammar. The prototypical predication
is the nuclear predication at RL, where qualified relations (Agent, Undergoer,
etc.) obtain between one or more arguments and a predicate.
While the nuclear predication may be the best documented case, it has
been argued that predicational configurations abound in Grammar. For instance,
Hengeveld (2004, p.375) observes that the head of the Discourse Act in FDG
constitutes a predication as well, while Harder (1996) in FG makes a similar
argument for conditionals. But more importantly, Hengeveld and Mackenzie
(2006, p.671) argue that a single formal algorithm governs the ‘general structure
of layers’ at all levels of Grammar. Although the formalism they use does not
cover the role of functions in the interaction between units, it seems a reasonable
assumption that, if one part of the ontology and syntax of underlying structure
is generally applicable, the same must go for the rest. Therefore I argue that,
mutatis mutandis, exactly the same characterisation of functions applies at IL
as at RL.
The formal syntax of function assignment in predicational configurations is
as follows.9 There must be one and only one relator slot, while all other slots
must be relata carrying a function that specifies the quality of their relation to
the relator. Furthermore, the relation between relatum and relator can only be
of a single quality, since multiple relations between relator and relatum (or a
9 An anonymous reviewer objects to my portrayal of the head of C as a predicational domain, arguing that it is
more appropriate to characterise it as juxtapositional in the sense that all evocational Subacts are simply
enumerated there. Although I am highly sympathetic towards this characterisation (see also p.101), it does
not in my view resolve the formal inconsistencies related to function assignment. That is, the defining
characteristic of a juxtapositional configuration is that all constituents involved in it are equal. They are
contiguous, with the relationships between them left to the inferential capacities of the NLU. In my
understanding of such a configuration, it is governed by a syntax similar to that in (2), only much simpler: in
order to preserve the equipollence of its constituent units, either all units in a juxtaposition carry a function,
or none at all. It is easy to see that none of the cases discussed in this section conform to this.
Alfa, São Paulo, 51 (2): 91-118, 200798
single relation with multiple qualities) lead to ambiguity (cf. FILLMORE, 2003,
p.151). Third, a relator cannot enter into the same qualitative relationship with
multiple relata, again because this would yield an uninterpretable complex
designation (cf. Bohnemeyer’s (2003) Argument Uniqueness Constraint). This is
summarised in (2):
(2) In predicational configurations
a. functions come with the slots of the frame in which they occur;
b. there is one and only one relator slot, which carries no function;
c. there are one or more relata, all of which carry one and only one function;
d. the same function cannot be assigned to more than one relatum.
The above syntax has generally been adhered to in the context of semantic
analysis at RL, in which all arguments traditionally carry one function and no
function ever occurs twice. However, in the assignment of Topic and Focus it
appears that virtually every conceivable situation other than the one discussed
in (1’) constitutes a violation of one or more of the above rules, which makes
information packaging by means of function assignment highly problematic. I
will now discuss four examples where the intended packaging structure is
incompatible with the syntax of function assignment given in (2).
First to discuss are cases that can be loosely described as narrow predicate
focus. An example is given in (3):
(3) A: Did the butcher chóp the meat?
B: Chóp? He shrèdded it
In (3B), nothing but the denotation of the predicate ‘shred’ is informative:
everything else is presupposed, including the representational frame in which
the predicate is to be inserted. Nevertheless, three evocational Subacts are
performed; two referential Subacts that re-evoke the accessible discourse
referents ‘the butcher’ and ‘the meat’, and one ascriptive Subact that evokes
the Focal denotation ‘shred’. The interpersonal and representational structures
of (3B) are given in (3’):
(3’) IL: A1: [— (C1: [
f1(-id T1)Foc 
x1(+id R1)Top 
x2(+R2)])Ø —]
RL: pst e1: [—[(f1: —shred—) (x1)A (x2)U]—]
As can be seen, (3’) satisfies the syntax for function assignment, since the
head of C1 contains two units that have been assigned one unique function,
and one (R2) with no function at all. However, this would make R2 ‘the meat’ the
relator in this configuration, which is difficult to reconcile conceptually, because
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it seems that neither the non-retrievability of ‘shred’ nor the topicality of ‘the
butcher’ are assigned by ‘the meat’.
While (3), however counterintuitive, still more or less obeys the syntax of function
assignment, a real violation occurs in cases where we have multiple evocational
Subacts that are unmarked for their packaging function. Consider (4), where both
the ascriptive Subact evoking the main predicate, and the referential Subact evoking
the Beneficiary referent ‘the butcher’ are not assigned an informational function:10
(4) A: What did the poulterer sell the bútcher?
B: He sold him some èggs
In the example above, the referent ‘some eggs’ is the informative part of the
assertion and is evoked by means of a Subact with Focus function; ‘the poulterer’
is the Topic, and is evoked by means of a Subact with that function. This leaves
two Subacts with no informational marking; that evoking ‘sell’, and that evoking
‘the butcher’. This violates (2b) because only one Subact (the one that serves as
the relator) must be without a function, as (4’) illustrates:
(4’) IL: A1: [— (C1: [
f1(+id T1) 
x1(+id R1)Top 
x2(-R2)Foc 
x3(+id R3)???])Ø —]
RL: pst e1: [—[(f1: —sell—) (x1)A (x2: —some eggs—)U (x3)B]—]
Another class of problematic cases is formed by those in which Topic and
Focus are assigned to the same evocational Subact. A case in point are new
Topics which, according to Dik (1997, p.316) “combine properties from the
dimensions of topicality and focality”. Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2008,
Forthcoming) propose to abandon NewTop as a separate function, and replace
it by a conflation of Top and Foc functions on a single evocational Subact.
However, such multiple function assignment to a single unit violates (2c) as it
yields an ambiguous (and thereby uninterpretable) configuration. Consider (5):
(5) (Suddenly,) ìn came the butcher
IL: A1: [— (C1: [
f1(-T1) 
x1(-id R1)TopFoc])Ø —]
RL: pst e1: [—[(f1: —come.in—) (x1: —the butcher—)A] —]
Next, there are cases whose interpretation requires that a single function is
‘spread’ over multiple evocational Subacts. Consider (6):
10 The violation discussed in this example is probably the most pervasive. Especially in conjunction with the
idea that evocational Subacts evoking complex denotations are to be represented as a series of juxtaposed
rather than layered elements, this problem occurs in virtually every Discourse Act.
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(6) A: what about the bútcher?
B: he insulted the cùstomer
In the context of A’s question, B’s reply aims to instantiate an apparent gap
in (PA) by supplying a non-retrievable entry for the address identified by ‘the
butcher’, i.e. the past event of him insulting the customer. In the example at
hand, a single UPDATE instruction relates ‘the butcher’ and ‘he insulted the
customer’. However, the formal algorhitm offers no possibility of ‘spreading’ a
single function over multiple constituents, as (6’) illustrates:
(6’) IL: A1: [—(C1: [
f1(-idT1)Foc 
x1(+id R1)Top 
x2(+id R2)Foc])Ø —]
RL: pst e1: [—[(f1: —insult—) (x1)A (x2: —customer—)U]—]
In the interpersonal structure in (6’), Focus is assigned to T1 and R2. As will
be clear, this analysis violates the syntax of function assignment proposed in
(2d). In conjunction with this case, consider now (7):
(7) A: What about the butcher’s insùlting anyone lately?
B: He insulted a cústomer yèsterday
This example illustrates the well-documented issue of multiple Focus
assignment. Many languages, notably those that rely on prosodic strategies to
express Focus, allow for the evocation of multiple Focal elements in a single assertion.
An expression like (7B) instantiates two open slots in the Addressee’s presupposition;
one concerning the identity of the insultee, the other the temporal specification of
the event. Irrespective of additional inferences regarding contrastiveness, set
membership, list-readings etc. that such statements may carry (cf. UMBACH, 2004),
the fact that the customer and yesterday are also both focal is generally undisputed.
However, since the two evocational Subacts in (7B), represented in (7’) as R2 and R3,
mark two independent Focal relations, its interpersonal structure violates (2d).
(7’) IL: A1: [—(C1: [
f1(+id T1) 
x1(+id R1)Top 
x2(-id R2)Foc 
t1(-id R3)Foc])Ø —]
RL: pst e1: [—[(f1: —insult--) (x1)A (x2: —customer—)U]—]:
[(t1: —yesterday—) (e1)Ø]
But apart from this violation, if we compare (6’) and (7’) we see that the
formalism cannot distinguish spreaded assignment of one Focus function to
multiple evocational Subacts, from the assignment of multiple Focus functions
in a single Communicated Content.
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The formal problems discussed so far in my view provide sufficient reason
to claim that function assignment is not a suitable way to deal with the modelling
of Topic and Focus.
In addition to the formal objections against pragmatic function assignment
as a way to model information packaging, there is a deeper problem with this
approach. That is, since functions in FDG are not assigned randomly but enter
the Formulator as part of frames instead, assigning packaging functions to
evocational Subacts presupposes the existence of ‘evocational frames’, lexically
predetermined configurational primitives that govern the possible combinations
of evocational Subacts in a Communicated content.
While I will argue in section 5 that we certainly need frames to deal with
variation in information packaging, I believe that the concept of evocational
frames is problematic, because the Fund cannot feasibly be argued to contain
an exhaustive list of all possible combinations of evocational Subacts that users
of a language may need at some point in time to attain a communicative
intention. This inventory would be practically infinite, since the required amount
of evocation varies strongly, and depends on a multitude of extralinguistic factors
(communicative intention, interlocutors involved, personal communication styles,
physical and discourse context, etc.). Also, invoking evocational frames would
essentially mean that the Fund, i.e. the Grammar, places constraints on the
communicative potential of a language, an assumption that goes against essential
functionalist principles such as non-aprioricity (HASPELMATH, 2007).
Therefore, rather than postulating evocational frames, the type and number
of Subacts needed must be considered a consequence of contextual and
representational choices, and should not be constrained by the availability of a
priori defined combinatorial primitives. As is also pointed out in Hengeveld and
Smit (Forthcoming) and Butler (Forthcoming), the performance of evocational
Subacts constitutes the final stage of formulation, and is ‘consequential’ in the
sense that the head of C simply accommodates whatever Subacts of evocation
the Speaker requires. Because the performance of evocational Subacts is not a
matter of substantiating pre-existing slots in a frame, the option of qualifying
relations between them in my view does not apply at all.
4.2 Notional objections
Another set of problems concerns the notional implications of modelling
information packaging in terms of function assignment. These problems are
twofold, and pertain to the status of topicality and focality as relations within
Grammar on the one hand, and the mutual independence of information
packaging and evocational structure on the other.
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To start with the former, Lambrecht (1994) presents a comprehensive theory
for the analysis of sentential information structure, in which Topic and Focus
are captured as relations. In Lambrecht’s view, Topic conveys a pragmatic
relation of relevance holding between a referent and an assertion, while Focus
conveys a relation of non-retrievability between what is asserted and what is
presupposed. The relational definition of these informational categories enables
Lambrecht to make a clear distinction between Topic and Focus as informational
relations on the one hand, and non-relational activation state that predictably
interacts with it on the other.
However, the relations identified by Lambrecht are not part of Grammar: as
was pointed out in section 2, they are relations holding between propositions in
discourse knowledge, i.e. in the contextual component. What is part of Grammar
are the exponents between which they are established in the course of verbal
interaction. Through the successful identification of these exponents in the
interpersonal structure of the message, a pragmatically competent language
user is able to infer the intended relations that the speaker wants him to construe
in his discourse knowledge. In order to avoid terminological confusion, I will
use the terms topicality and focality when referring to the ‘Lambrechtian’
informational relations obtaining in discourse knowledge: for the marking of
their exponents in Grammar, I use Topic (identifying the address), Comment
(identifying the entry) and Focus (identifying the update).11
There are at least two types of statements which indicate that Topic and
Focus do not mark relations in Grammar, but non-relational exponents of
contextual relations instead. These are all-Focus Acts and elliptical Acts.
Regarding the former, consider expressions like (8) in which the entire
communicated content of an Act is non-retrievable in the context of presupposed
knowledge, and thereby informational. The representation in (8’) shows the
current FDG treatment of such Acts:
(8) (Have you heard?) The bútcher died!
(8’) IL: A1: [(F1) (P1)S (P2)A (C1: [
f1(-T1) 
x1(-id R1)])Foc]
RL: pst e1: [—[(f1: —die—) (x1: —butcher—)U]—]
The assignment of Foc to C1 in (8’) must be taken to establish a focality
relation between C1 and F1, seen that functions qualify the interaction between
equipollent units. But this makes no sense, because the domain of focality is
11 I will not consider the possible linguistic relevance of Background (the logical complement of Focus) in this
article. The reason for this is, that a functional rationale to convey presupposed knowledge appears to be
missing. It is more attractive in my view to account for Background marking as an epiphenomenon, deriving
from requirements at the Structural level.
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that of communicated knowledge to which the units outside C1 do not belong
at all. Moreover, (8’) does not capture the informational structure that intuitively
underlies (8). What an utterance like (8) aims at is the construal of a previously
irretrievable relation between the communicated content of A1 in its entirety,
and other discourse knowledge. Since this other discourse knowledge is not
part of A1 but is located in the contextual component, it follows that focality
cannot obtain within A1, but must be construed in the contextual component.
Modelling focality as a relation in the discourse Act is not viable.12
The relevance of focality as a relation in the communicative content is
challenged furthermore by the existence of elliptic single-constituent answers,
as exemplified in (9B).
(9) A: Who did the butcher insúlt?
B: A cùstomer
(9’) IL: A1: [— (C1: [
x2(-id R1)Foc])Ø —]
RL: pst e1: [—[(f1) (x1)A (x2: —customer—)U]—]
In (9B), only the referent that enriches A’s presupposition ‘the butcher insulted
__’ is evoked. But as can be seen in (9’), Focus assignment again would result in
the marking of a relation that does not obtain in Grammar: in fact, since the
contents of C1 consist of a single Subact only, a relation cannot be modelled at
all. The relation of irretrievability between the referent ‘a customer’ and A’s
presupposition obtains in the contextual component and not at IL in Grammar.
Turning now to the relationship between information structuring and
evocation, it should be noted that by modelling information packaging by means
of functions assigned to evocational Subact, FDG makes the former dependent
on the latter. I believe that this is misguided, since evocations are merely
instrumental in carrying out the desired manipulation of the addressee’s
presuppositional state (see also BUTLER, Forthcoming). Hence, information
packaging should be dissociated from evocation and be modelled in its own
right instead.
Especially for Topical referents, the dependence of information packaging
on evocation is problematic. Topical status has a strong correlation with
givenness of the corresponding denotatum (CHAFE, 1976; GUNDEL et al., 1993)
and is typically governed by special pragmatic presupposition of consciousness
(LAMBRECHT, 2001, p.475); as a result, Topical referents are prime candidates
12 Dik’s characterisation of functions merely states that functions operate ‘in some wider setting’ (DIK, 1978,
p.129), and does not specify what that setting should be. However, FDG’s formalist aspirations in my view
necessitate a more stringent definition of its domain of application, namely the equipollent configuration.
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for suppression in many languages. But, how can packaging status be assigned
to a non-evoked participant, if it is dependent on evocation? The point is that a
statement with a non-evoked Topic may behave differently syntactically from
one with no Topic at all. Consider the examples from Kinyarwanda in (10)-(11):
(10) (what about the guests?)
(aba-shyitsi) ba-ra-riríimbir-a mu gisagára
CL2-guest CL2-prs-sing-impf in village
‘they are singing in the village’
(11) (what’s that sound?)
ha-ra-riríimbir-a aba-shyitsi mu gisagára
CL16-prs-sing-impf CL2-guest in village
‘there are guests singing in the village’
(Kinyarwanda, Bantu. Cited in LAMBRECHT, 2000, p.643)
In (10), where the Topic is omitted, the Subject is cross-referenced on the verb
riríimbir ‘sing’ by means of a [+human] classifier. In (11), where there is no relation
of aboutness between ‘the guests’ and the event of singing in the village, a
[-human] classifier is used. If we make the Topical status of shyitsi ‘guests’ in
(10) dependent on evocation, there is no way that we can account for the different
choice of prefix in (10) and (11).
4.3 Descriptive problems: VP
The last objection against information packaging by means of pragmatic
function assignment that I want to discuss is descriptive in nature. That is, it
seems that many languages make use of syntactic and prosodic constituents
for which representational nor interpersonal motivation can be given in the
current architecture of FDG. In particular, the Verb Phrase (VP) is relevant here.
As is well-documented for a large number of languages, VP figures in a
considerable number of syntactic phenomena, illustrated for English in (12):
(12) The butcher [insulted a cùstomer]i
a. … and [so did]i the poùlterer
b. … and the poùlterer [Ø]i, too
c. [insult a cústomer]i,
the butcher would never do tháti
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d. [insult a cùstomer]i he did in the pást;
[insult a cùstomer]i he will do agaìn
e. what the bútcher did was [insult a cùstomer]i
f. (what did the butcher do?) [insult a customer]i
As these examples show, insult the customer may be anaphorically referred
to (12a) and constitutes a gap bound by too (12b), both of which clearly show
that there must be a corresponding unit at one of the underlying levels of
representation. Furthermore, it figures as a constituent in word order
permutations (12c-d) and clefting strategies like the the one in (12e). Finally, as
shown in (12f), the constituent in isolation is a well-formed reply to certain kinds
of questions.
Notwithstanding the phenomena in (12), FG has persistently treated VP as
an epiphenomenon with no corresponding unit in underlying clause structure.
A prime example of this is found in Mackenzie (1983) where it is shown
convincingly that FG, unlike some other frameworks, does not need VP as an
underlying notion to account for certain Subject-Object asymmetries, but can
relate those to other semantic factors instead. The main reason for this reluctance
appears to be that an underlying unit corresponding to VP would lack an obvious
motivation in the semantics on which FG is founded.13 Nevertheless, it seems
rather dissatisfying to do away with the order permutations and other
constructions illustrated in (12) as mere ‘side-effects’. Two cases, (12a-b), are
particularly salient in this respect because they show unequivocally that the
combination of predicate and undergoer argument can license a gap and serve
as an antecedent for anaphora.
In my view, this must be taken to mean that the elements in VP constitute a
single unit at some underlying level in Grammar. Since the semantics of FDG
are similar to those used by FG, RL is not a likely candidate to accommodate
such a layer because the combination of predicate and undergoer argument
does not constitute a clear semantic type.14 But what if the unit motivating VP
is not semantic in nature, but interpersonal? In that case, the fact that IL and RL
are orthogonal in FDG enables us to invoke a functional correlate of VP at IL. I
13 FG semantics is extensional, in that it deals with the construal of entities that correspond to some
extralinguistic ‘reality’ and have ontological properties. VP escapes extensional definition in that it does not
correspond to a known entity type, and cannot be defined in ontological terms equivalent to those used to
define other entity types. By contrast, intensional semantic theories, notably Type Theory (GAMUT, 1991),
do have the means to define the semantic analogue of VP.
14 An anonymous reviewer suggests that VP can be given a semantic motivation in FG, namely that of ‘extended
predicate’. However, this notion is not part of the inventory of semantic types suggested in Dik (1997), nor
does it occur elsewhere in the FG literature.
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will return to this idea below, and argue that VP corresponds to a new
informational unit at that level.
5 Frame-based information packaging
In this section, I will propose an alternative account of information packaging
in FDG. But first, let’s sum up the requirements that such a model has to meet.
As has been argued extensively in the previous section, information
packaging cannot rely on functions as its formal primitives, and the new model
should offer satisfactory solutions to the formal, notional and descriptive problems
noted there. In view of the apparent cross-linguistic relevance of certain
oppositions in information packaging, in particular that between categorical
and non-categorical Acts, it is furthermore desirable that the new approach can
account for these in a principled fashion, thus enhancing FDG’s typological
adequacy. Related to this, the new model should be able to account for apparent
constraints on information packaging straightforwardly, such as the cross-
linguistically well-attested prohibition on multiple Topics in a single Act.
In what follows, I will first consider the best place in FDG to accommodate
information packaging. Then, I will turn to the question of how it can be modelled.
Besides functions, the inventory of formal primitives in FDG offers layers and
operators as means to do this. I will introduce the idea that the categories belonging
to the packaging dimension of addressation are best modelled by means of layers.
Focus, on the contrary, is more suitably modelled as an operator. The possible
combinations of addressation layers and focus positions can be captured in an
elegant fashion by a limited number of packaging frames, reflecting informational
articulations (VALLDUVÍ, 1992) or modes of message management (HANNAY, 1991).
5.1 The locus of information packaging
Information packaging seems to be a somewhat hybrid concept in relation
to the architecture of FDG. On the one hand, it is unmistakably interpersonal in
the sense that language users calibrate their Acts to their assumptions about
the interlocutor’s state of discourse knowledge. On the other, it is representational
in the sense that information packaging targets the denotation rather than the
evocation of the Act. This can be seen in cases like (9), where a non-evoked
Topic exerts an influence on the structure of the expression.
So, what should be the locus of information packaging in Grammar? Arguably
the most principled way to deal with its hybrid nature would be to create an
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entirely new level of analysis for information packaging. However, since that
would result in massive system redundancy, and seen that the primary motivation
of information packaging still is interpersonal, my alternative analysis retains C
as its locus in Grammar. In the characterisation by Hengeveld and Mackenzie
(2006, p.672), C “contains everything the Speaker wishes to evoke in his or her
communication with the Addressee”. This should be made somewhat more
precise, since language users do not just evoke things, but perform evocations
with the purpose of manipulating the interlocutor’s discourse knowledge. In
other words, C contains an informationally structured representation of
everything the Speaker wishes to evoke in his or her communication with the
Addressee,15 as is reflected in (13):
(13) Ai: [(Fi) (Pi)S (Pj)A (Ci: [informationally structured evocation])Ø]
To apply a packaging structure to the communicated content of a DECLarative
Act in my view is not an option available to the speaker, but a necessary choice.
Because a DECLarative Act conveys a representational structure, packaging
necessarily has to be applied to its communicated content so that it can be processed
in the addressee’s discourse knowledge. From this it follows that there can be no
such thing as a ‘pragmatically neutral’ statement, a term which frequently occurs
in the literature. Rather, as is also pointed out by Lambrecht (1994, p.15 ff), languages
use expression strategies that are specialised to a greater or lesser extent for the
expression of a particular mode of packaging. However, absence of specific structural
markedness does not entail absence of information packaging; instead, I take it to
mean that a number of distinct packaging structures is neutralised in the expression.
In terms of the ‘etic/emic’ distinction discussed by De Vries (1993), the model of
information packaging that I propose is therefore ‘emic’, and reflects notional
categories that do not necessarily have an ‘etic’ correlate in surface structure
(although they can obviously be identified on the basis of context).
5.2 Layers for addressation
I argued in 4.2. that the packaging dimension of addressation cannot not be
made dependent on evocational Subacts because it targets the representational
structure of the message as a whole and not just the part that is evoked. Therefore,
we need to capture it by means of dedicated primitives, and it appears that
layers are a better candidate for this than operators for two reasons.
15 Incidentally, limiting the domain of information packaging to the head of C also yields correct predictions
regarding the impossibility of marking units outside this slot as either Topic or Focus. For instance, neither
Topic nor Focus can be assigned to Discourse Act modifiers like frankly, or C-modifiers like German
bekanntermassen, which are outside the scope of C.
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First, Hengeveld and Mackenzie (Forthcoming) point to the actional rather
than symbolic nature of various units at IL: Moves, Acts and Subacts all designate
actions performed by the Speaker. The model of discourse knowledge
management outlined in section 2 perceives the packaging instructions involved
in addressation, GOTO and ASSESS, in the same fashion. They are actional, in
that they instruct the addressee to perform particular manipulations on his
discourse knowledge. Hence, it stands to reason to portray the interpersonal
correlates of these instructions in a similar fashion, and postulate information
packaging layers corresponding to them in the head of C.
Second, a wide array of publications has observed systematic differences in
encoding between categorical Acts that provide information about an address
in discourse knowledge and non-categorical Acts that do not, but instead just
posit new information without construing a topicality relation.16 Interestingly,
the classical terminology used to describe this distinction draws on the concept
of predication (cf. CORNISH, 2004). A categorical Act constitutes a ‘psychological
predication’ in which the information is predicated over the ‘psychological
Subject’ (the address), while in a non-categorical Act such predication is absent.
I find this a very appealing way to capture what appears a fundamental
dichotomy in declarative utterances, and in the formal inventory of FDG layers
seem an excellent way to model this. Therefore, I propose a system of layers in
the head of C, which may occur in predicational and non-predicational
configurations. One of these layers must correspond to the GOTO-instruction,
for which I will invoke a Topic layer (Top). The head of Top will typically be
either empty if there is no need to re-evoke the discourse referent that
instantiates the address, or it will contain a referential Subact.
Turning now to the complement of Top, Lambrecht (1994) presents a slightly
different take on the categorical/non-categorical distinction, arguing that it can
be captured more elegantly in terms of the size of the Focus domain. That is,
rather than speaking of psychogical predication he contends that a non-
categorical Act is characterised by the fact that its Focus domain encompasses
the entire contents of the statement, including the referent that would otherwise
have been the preferred Topic. This reasoning entails that the complement of
Topic in categorical statements should be Focus, and this is what we find in
Van Valin (2005, p.81) who argues that “VPs, to the extent that they exist in
languages, are the grammaticalisation of Focus structure”.17
16 Cf. Lambrecht (2000); Lambrecht and Polinsky (1997); Matras and Sasse (1995); Sasse (1987) for extensive
discussion of the thetic-categorical opposition in a large number of genetically unrelated languages, including
all Romance languages and English.
17 In a canonical English sentence, Topic and Subject (or psychological and syntactic Subject) coincide. By
consequence, so do their complements.
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Although it is doubtlessly the case that the complement of Topic is typically
focal, I believe that there are three reasons why postulating a Focus layer as the
complement of Topic is an oversimplification of the facts. First, such an account
rules out the possibility that Topic and Focus coincide on a single referent. But
in many languages such conflation is perfectly possible, as (14) shows:
(14) (he [turtle] knew that he had not called them)
ìtó ni  

adrúpì Ø- 

ungw 

e n `i
hare 3sg.spec brother 3(II)-call foc
‘hare his brother called (them)’
(Ma’di, Sudanic. BLACKINGS; FABB, 2003, p.676)
In this example, the clause-final n `i is a pronominal Focus marker bound to the
adjoined Subject NP ‘hare his brother’, which is the Topic of this and the subsequent
clause. If Focus is the complement of Topic, they would be mutually exclusive and
examples like this one could not be satisfactorily accounted for.18 Second, it must
be noted that the Focus domain may also be smaller than the entire complement of
Topic, as is the case in Narrow Focus constructions. An example of this we have
seen in (4), where ‘some eggs’ constitutes the update of A’s presupposition ‘the
poulterer sold the butcher __’. However, having Focus as the complement of Topic
would mean in this case that part of the communicated content would not be
packaged at all, and would hence be uninterpretable. Third, if Focus were the
complement of Topic, all non-categorical statements would become informationally
identical; namely, they would all consist of a Focus layer only. Yet, there seem to be
two broad classes of non-categorical statements that are identical in some, but
distinct in other respects. I will return to this observation in section 5.4.
For the three reasons mentioned so far, I postulate Comment (Cm) as the
complement of Topic. Whereas Top is an actional layer giving the addressee a
GOTO instruction, Cm provides the instruction to ASSESS a piece of information.
Both layers conform to Hengeveld and Mackenzie’s generalised layered structure
and command an operator position, needed to accommodate Focality.
5.3 Focus as an operator
The previous section gave three arguments why Focus is not a suitable
complement for Top. However, a fourth argument can be advanced, namely
that Focus simply cannot have layer status at all. Instead, I will argue in this
18 Note that Focal Topics, although attested in various languages, are generally considered to violate cognitive
principles of information pressure (cf. 5.4). For that reason, many languages eschew or disallow them.
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section that Focus should be modelled as an operator that can be attached at
various units in the informationally structured communicated content.
The reason that Focus cannot be modelled as a layer has to do with the
nature of the packaging relation in which it is involved. I argued in section 3
that UPDATE is momentaneous in that the non-retrievability that characterises
the relation dissolves the moment it is established. This is different for the
relevance relation between an address and its entries which is stable, and extends
over the entire duration of the communicative exchange. Now, if Focus is an
actional notion that reflects the instruction to establish a particular non-
retrievable relationship between pieces of knowledge, it will be clear that this
can be done only once. Although the knowledge involved can be referred back
to afterwards, the formerly irretrievable relation cannot be ‘re-established’. To
illustrate this, consider (15):19
(15) hé [insulted the cùstomer]i, and the poúlterer [Ø]i toò
(15’)IL1: C1: [(Top1: [
butcher(+id R1)]) (Foc1: [
insult(–id T1) 
customer(+id R2)])]
IL2: C2: [(Top2: [
poulterer(+id R3)]) (Foc1)]
While the gap is indeed bound by the knowledge evoked through T1 and R2, in
IL2 this is no longer Focus, and can therefore not be referred to by means of this
actional constituent. By contrast, the ASSESS instruction reflected by Cm can
be re-issued. consider the following:
(16) The butcher sells veal chops. He does so every monday
(16’)IL1: C1: [(Top1: [
butcher(+id R1)]) (Cm1: [
sell(-id T1) 
veal chops(R2)])]
IL2: C2: [(Top1: [
butcher(+id R3)]) (Cm1: [(
every mondayR4)])]
By uttering the second part of (16), the speaker invites the addressee to re-
assess the information supplied in the first part, and augment it with the habitual
temporal specification ‘every Monday’. In other words, the same packaging
instruction Cm1 is issued twice.
Another point concerns the objection raised in section 4 that information
packaging should not be made dependent on evocational structure. While this
is certainly true for addressation, one exponent of which may be left unevoked
on account of the accompanying presupposition of consciousness that Topics
typically involves (cf. LAMBRECHT, 2001, p.475), this is different for Focus. Focus,
which marks a pragmatic relation of non-retrievability, is crucially dependent
19 The alternative reading of (15), which can be paraphrased as ‘he insulted the customer, and he insulted the
poulterer as well’, is ruled out by the bracketing.
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on the expression of its exponent: how else can the non-retrievable relation be
construed successfully?
For these reasons, I propose to model Focus as an operator that applies
either to individual evocational Subacts, or to one of the layers involved in
addressation that I defined in the preceding section. This way, we can distinguish
between constructions with a new Topic (Focus on the Topic layer), wide Focus
(Focus on the Comment layer), and narrow Focus (Focus on an evocational Subact
within the Comment). Whether a Focus operator can be assigned only once per
communicated content, or to multiple units, is still considered a matter of
typological preference.
5.4 Packaging frames
To sum up the previous sections, I argued that we need dedicated layers in
the head of Ci to capture both exponents of the addressation dimension: a Top-
layer to capture the GOTO instruction, and a Cm-layer to capture the ASSESS
instruction. In addition to that, a Focus operator (Foc) is needed that can attach
to whatever constitutes the UPDATE of the Act, be it one of the addressation
layers or, in the case of narrow Focus constructions, an evocational Subact.
Furthermore, different combinations of Top and Cm are needed to capture the
basic distinction between categorical and non-categorical statements. Consider
the formalised summary in (17):
(17) a. Ci: [(π Topi)Φ (π Cmi)] categorical
b. Ci: [(π Topi)] presentational
c. Ci: [(π Cmi)] thetic
The operator position on the layers Top and Cm is indicated by π, and can
be occupied by a Focus operator. In a categorical Act (17a), Top and Cm interact
in a predicational configuration where the latter is predicated over the former.20
It instructs the Addressee to open the discourse address designated by the
Topical referent, and assess there the relevant information designated by the
Comment. For both non-categorical Acts, such a relation is absent because
they contain only one of the addressation layers. Incidentally, note how this
representation does justice to the similarities between presentational and thetic
statements that are observed in the literature (the absence of ‘pyschological
predication’ and the fact that they are all-focus), without obscuring their
20 An anonymous reviewer suggests that Top and its complement may be in a juxtapositional rather than a
predicational relationship. It is in fact conceivable that the type of configuration is a parameter for cross-
linguistic variation, but this will have to be investigated further.
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differences. Namely, while a thetic Act posits information in discourse knowledge
without instructing the addressee what to relate it to, a presentational Act
construes an address without supplying information to assess there. This may
explain why thetics and presentationals exhibit similar morphosyntactic
properties in some languages, and are expressed differently in others (SASSE,
1987). In an approach like Lambrecht’s (1994) Focus Structures that tries to
identify packaging configurations entirely in terms of focality, this distinction
cannot be made.
The constructs in (17) constitute packaging frames, similar to the event
frames in the nuclear predication at RL and illocutionary frames in the Act at IL.
The basic frames mentioned so far reflect three central informational
articulations. These are event-reporting, (re)activating a Topical discourse
referent, and commenting on an established Topic. I will assume that these are
universal, and can be identified in every language given sufficient discourse or
the right elicitation experiment.21 It will be noted that configurationally speaking,
the thetic and presentational frames are both avalent, and do not predicate
informational relations, even though both designate different informational units.
Individual languages may require the definition of more complex frames as
well, such as frames for multiple Topic statements (attested in Ostyak, cf.
NIKOLAEVA,  2001), multiple Comments, etc. Nevertheless, even though data
from individual languages may give rise to the definition of such additional
frames, it should be noted that their numbers will be limited, and that they can
be listed exhaustively with relative ease. In that respect, informational frames
do not suffer the ‘unboundedness problem’ that would present itself with
evocational frames, as was noted in p.101, because unlike these, the constraints
on possible informational frames are related to cognition and/or processing (cf.
CHAFE, 1994 One New Idea Constraint), and thus far more restrictive than
possible constraints on evocational frames.
6 Some examples
In this last section, I will provide analyses of some English sentences
according to the frame-based model of information packaging proposed in this
paper. It should be emphasised that these examples merely aim to illustrate
21 This universalist perspective notably deviates from canonical FDG in which the postulation of all underlying
elements must lead to an effect in surface structure. The present proposal is more closely allied with the
approach to Parts-of-Speech suggested in Hengeveld (1992), where universal functional categories map
onto expression in various ways, in the process of which distinctions between such categories may be
neutralised.
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how the system works, in particular with respect to some cases that proved
problematic under pragmatic function assignment.
In section 4, we have seen that the pragmatic function assignment approach
leads to a cumbersome analysis for certain cases of narrow predicate Focus. In
the framing approach, the use of a Focus operator on the appropriate evocational
Subact avoids this problem:
(18) A: (Did the butcher chóp the meat?)
B: (Chóp?) He SHRÈDDED it
(18’)IL: C1: [(Top1: [
he(id R1)]) (Cm1: [
shred(foc T1) 
it(id R2)])]
Adding a Focus operator to the ascriptive Subact instructs the Addressee
to update an extant entry under the appropriate discourse address (identified
by ‘the butcher’) with the information that the relational property involved is
‘shred’.
Likewise, multiple unmarked Subacts no longer constitute a problem, either:
(19) A: (What did the poulterer sell the bútcher?)
B: He sold him some èggs
(19’)C1:[(Top1: [
he(+id R1)]) (Cm1: [
sell(+id T1) 
him(+id R2) 
eggs(foc -id R3)])]
Since evocations are not involved in a predicational but a juxtapositional
configuration, it is no problem that they carry no functions.
As a third illustration, consider the case of new Topics, which under
pragmatic function assignment would simultaneously carry two functions. In
the informational frame approach, they can straightforwardly be modelled as
Top-layers with a Focus operator:
(20) Once there was a bùtcher
(20’)C1: [(foc Top1: [
butcher(-id R1)])]
Presentational statements typically use semantically ‘bleached’ verbs of
(CORNISH, 2004, p.219), suggesting that these merely serve as place-holders
and are not actively evoked and hence do not require corresponding Subacts at
IL. The informational function of there has long been subject to debate; it has
been suggested that it conveys an ‘abstract topic’ of sorts (cf. ERTESCHIK-
SHIR, 2007, among many others). If that were the case, English may be argued
not to have Top-only structures; nevertheless, other languages do, and allow for
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isolated NPs in this function, thus providing evidence that this frame is required.
Another approach would be to attribute the use of there to morphosyntax,
requiring the presence of a Subject with any inflected verb.
Thetic statements lack a Topic-Comment dichotomy, and are entirely Focal.
It was pointed out earlier that assigning a Focus function to Ci in such cases is
formally inconsistent. In the informational frame approach, we can render thetics
as Cm-only statements with a foc operator on the Cm-layer:
(21) A: (What’s that nóise?)
B: It’s the butcher shredding meàt
(21’)C1:[(foc Cm1: [
shred(-id T1) 
the butcher(+id R1) 
meat(-id R2)])]
English does not appear to exploit specialised expression strategies for thetic
statements, unlike many other languages that somehow make the Subject less
‘subjecty’ and therefore less prone to a Topical interpretation.
Finally, the framing approach is capable of dealing with non-evoked Topics,
making clear that they are not identical to thetic statements in which the Topic
unit is lacking altogether. In addition, (22’) makes clear that frames can
succesfully deal with wide focus constituents.
(22) A: (What did the butcher dó?)
B: insult the cùstomer
(22’)IL: C1: [(Top1: Ø) (foc Cm1: [
insult(-id T1) 
customer(+id R2)])]
In (22’), the categorical structure of the statement is still present, but the Topic
referent is not re-evoked, evidently because it is deemed sufficiently identifiable.
Since these ‘zero-Topic statements’ behave differently from thetic statements
in many languages, the representation in (22’) is not trivial, but captures a key
informational feature.
7 Conclusion
The paper has argued against the classical approach to information structure
as pragmatic function assignment in Functional Discourse Grammar, and has shown
that an alternative model, in which the complementary categories Topic and
Comment are portrayed as layers within the head of the communicated content,
and orthogonal Focus as an operator attaching to either informational or evocational
units, is more adequate descriptively, notionally, and in terms of formalisation.
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• RESUMO: Este trabalho trata do modelo de empacotamento da informação na Gramática
Discursivo-Funcional (GDF), em particular do tratamento de Tópico, Comentário e Foco.
A GDF atual herdou da FG a representação dessas categorias como funções, que se ligam
a Sub-atos evocativos. No entanto, argumentos de natureza formal, nocional e descritiva
podem ser propostos contra a atribuição de função pragmática e em favor de uma análise
alternativa na qual as estruturas informacionais e evocativas estão dissociadas, de forma
a comandar seus próprios primitivos. No contexto de um modelo de organização do
conhecimento discursivo no qual os conteúdos comunicados estão associados às
instruções de empacotamento que informam ao ouvinte como ele deve tratar o
conhecimento evocado, argumenta-se que a focalidade pode ser modelada por meio de
um operador de Foco que pode se ligar a vários constituintes no Nível Interpessoal. A
Topicalidade, por outro lado, diz respeito a modos binomiais e monomiais de apresentação
do conteúdo comunicado. Isso pode ser expresso por meio das unidades informacionais
Tópico e Comentário, que interagem nos esquemas.
• PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Empacotamento da informação; tópico; comentário; foco; Gramática
Discursivo-Funcional.
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